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I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from the denial of a motion for a preliminary 
injunction. Plaintiff Cindy Lee Garcia ("Plaintiff' or "Ms. Garcia") is an 
ordained Christian minister and an actress who delivered a dramatic 
supporting performance in what Defendant Nakoula Basseley Nakoula and 
his agents told her was a benign, low-budget "Arabian" desert adventure 
film. The film, Ms. Garcia was told, would be titled "Desert Warrior." 
Instead, Defendant Nakoula and/or his agents took Ms. Garcia's "Desert 
Warrior" performance, dubbed it over almost beyond recognition, and 
inserted it into the trailer for another film entirely, which Defendant Nakoula 
and/or his agents titled, "The Innocence of Muslims" (hereinafter both the 
film and its trailer will be referred to as the "Film"). In the trailer for the 
Film, Ms. Garcia, who had delivered lines for "Desert Warrior" expressing 
concern for her character's daughter, was instead made to appear, through 
post-performance dubbing in which she did not participate and to which she 
did not consent, to accuse Mohammed, the founder of the Islamic religion, 
of being a child molester. Subsequently, Ms. Garcia's altered performance 
was translated into Arabic, both through additional dubbing and/or through 
the use of subtitles; the versions of the Film that were accessible to an 
Arabic-speaking audience were posted on Y ouTube on or around September 
11,2012. That day, the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya, was attacked, 
resulting in the death of four Americans. Initially, both the worldwide 
media and the U.S. government blamed the Film for inciting the violence in 
Benghazi, the assassination of Benghazi-based U.S. Ambassador 
Christopher Stevens, and deadly, worldwide demonstrations against the 
Film. 
1 
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Although the ultimate cause of the attacks and demonstrations may 
never be known for certain, the main issue in this case involves the vicious 
frenzy against Ms. Garcia that the Film caused among certain radical 
elements of the Muslim community beginning around the time of the 
Benghazi attacks. Specifically, ever since Defendants posted the Arabic 
version of the Film to Y ouTube, Ms. Garcia has become the subject of an 
Egyptian fatwa, in which a prominent cleric called upon American Muslim 
youth to kill her; Ms. Garcia has received and continues to receive 
numerous, credible death threats. Shortly after she became aware of the 
existence of the Arabic version of the Film, and the death threats began to 
arrive, Ms. Garcia immediately sought to enjoin any further publication of 
her performance in the Film. The basis for the injunction is that the makers 
of the Film, along with the Film's republishers (which include Defendants 
Google, Inc. and Y ouTube, which have refused to remove the Film either as 
posted by Defendant Nakoula and his agents or by the hundreds of third 
parties who indisputably own no copyright in the Film), have violated her 
copyright interest in the dramatic performance that she gave for "Desert 
Warrior." At the district court, Ms. Garcia pointed out that she never 
consented to appear in "The Innocence of Muslims" and, in fact, had never 
released her copyright in "Desert Warrior" to any of the Defendants. 
Furthermore, Ms. Garcia noted that even if Defendants could argue that she 
had provided an "implied" license of her work for the Film "Desert 
Warrior," that consent was limited to the project in which she agreed to 
appear, and that Defendants had breached any implied license when they 
used her as a "puppet" who appeared to spout their hatred of Muslims and 
the Islamic religion. Finally, Ms. Garcia informed the district court that her 
2 
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life and the lives of her family members (who also have received death and 
rape threats) are in grave danger as the result of Defendants' actions. 
The district court declined to hear the matter on an ex parte basis and 
converted the application to a motion for a preliminary injunction. After the 
matter was fully briefed and without leave of court, just three days before 
the scheduled hearing, Defendants Google and Y ouTube submitted 
documents that purported to be a signed release by Plaintiff consenting to 
use of her performance in anything. On the eve of the hearing, the district 
denied the motion for preliminary injunction without even permitting a 
hearing, notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiff had already provided the 
district court with credible evidence (including the opinion of an expert 
handwriting analyst) that the documents submitted by Google and YouTube 
were forgeries. 
The first legal issue presented by this appeal is whether Plaintiff 
Garcia established that, in the absence of an injunction, she will suffer 
irreparable harm. Surely, the official pronouncement of a death sentence on 
Plaintiff, followed by numerous credible death threats, as a result of her 
appearance in the Film must constitute irreparable harm. The district court 
erred when it focused on the fact that Defendant Nakoula and/or his agents 
quietly posted an English-language version of the Film on YouTube in July 
of 20 12, which received no media attention and no attention from the 
radicals that currently are threatening Ms. Garcia. The critical time frame 
begins at the moment at which Plaintiff s life was placed in danger - and 
that did not occur until after the Benghazi attacks on September 11, 2012, 
when the Film received worldwide notoriety. Plaintiff, a woman of 
extremely modest means, acted promptly by seeking court relief within a 
week in the state court and then by seeking federal court protection within 
3 
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less than 30 days. The district court's conclusion-that that Plaintiff waited 
too long and thus that her life was not worth saving-was an abuse of 
discretion. To the extent that the district court held that numerous and 
credible death threats against Plaintiff do not constitute irreparable hann, 
such a conclusion is also an abuse of discretion. 
The second issue is whether Ms. Garcia has a legally cognizable 
copyright claim. The district court held that Ms. Garcia was not the "author" 
of the Film - i.e., its producer or director - and therefore her perfonnance in 
"Desert Warrior" was somehow merged into a unitary whole together with 
Defendants' hateful propaganda film, causing her to lose all of her 
intellectual property rights in her creative acting performance. This was an 
incorrect statement of the law, and this Court should review it de novo. 
Contrary to the trial court's conclusion, an actor does, in fact, retain a 
copyright in his or her performance (once it is fixed in a tangible medium) 
unless she is an employee, has signed a release, or has agreed in writing that 
the performance is a work for hire. None of those copyright exceptions 
apply in this case. What's more, even if Ms. Garcia did convey an "implied" 
license to Defendant Nakoula and/or his agents (which she did not), that 
license extended only to the performance that she actually gave, which was a 
benign supporting role in the "Desert Warrior" adventure film. Neither 
Defendants nor the trial court cited any authority (and Plaintiff believes that 
no such authority exists) that the "implied license" exception upon which 
Defendants and the trial court relied extends to entirely unrelated projects 
and/or willful deception of the actor as to the nature of the project, as 
occurred in this case. Indeed, it is undisputed that the film "Desert Warrior" 
contained no references to the Muslim faith or its founder, Mohammed. 
Plaintiff neither expressly nor impliedly consented that her dramatic 
4 
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perfonnance could be used, dubbed over with hateful dialogue and inserted 
into the propaganda Film. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it refused 
to issue a preliminary injunction, and Plaintiff respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the trial court's decision. 
II. JURISDICTION 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
because Plaintiff brought her claims under federal law, specificaily under the 
United States Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 101, et seq. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether Plaintiff will suffer irreparable hann in the absence of 
a preliminary injunction, 
2. Whether an actor retains a copyright interest in her dramatic 
perfonnance fixed to a tangible medium, particularly in the absence of a 
signed writing or release, such that she may assert a copyright claim where 
her perfonnance is taken from one film and inserted into a completely 
different film, for which she also did not sign a release, even if that actor is 
found to have granted an implied limited license to use her perfonnance in 
the first film. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 26, 2012, just 15 days after the attacks in Benghazi, 
Plaintiff Garcia brought suit against "Nakoula Basseley Nakoula," Google, 
Inc., and YouTube LLC. Complaint (Excerpts of Record ("ER '') 1-62.) 
Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (the "Complaint") on October 4, 
2012, which amended Defendant Nakoula's name to Mark Yousseff 
("Y ousseff'), after it was revealed in his federal criminal probation 
revocation proceeding that he had lied to the United States District Court, 
5 
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the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Probation 
Department about his true name. First Amended Complaint (HF A C '); ER 
63. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Y ousseff violated Plaintiff s copyright 
interest in her dramatic performance by taking her performance in the 
supposedly benign film "Desert Warrior" and dubbing it over with hateful 
words in English and Arabic, as well as subtitling the hateful words in 
Arabic, and placing her performance into the Film, a trailer entitled 
"Innocence of Muslims." FAC ~ 4; ER 65. Initially, the world media 
reported the Film as having caused havoc in the Middle East and elsewhere. 
FAC ~~ 1-3; ER 64. Plaintiff alleged secondary infringement claims against 
Google and Y ouTube for republishing the Film, which resulted in gruesome 
and credible death threats and an Egyptian cleric's issuance of a "fatwa" 
demanding Plaintiffs death. FAC ~ 35; ER 71. 
On October 11,2012, Plaintiff made a routine ex parte application for 
an order to exceed the page limits of her brief. Plaintiff's Ex Parte 
Application to Exceed page Limits Set Forth in Local Rule 11-6; ER 123. 
The district court denied the application on October 15,2012. ER 133-134. 
On October 17, 2012, Plaintiff applied for a temporary restraining order. ER 
135. The district court denied the application and converted the application 
to a motion for a preliminary injunction. ER 601-602. On October 29, 
2012, Defendants Google and Y ouTube (but not Y ousseff) opposed the 
motion. ER 611-641. Plaintiff filed a reply on November 5, 2012. ER 686-
783. The hearing was set for December 3,2012. 
On November 28,2012, without leave of court to file any additional 
papers, Defendants Google and Y ouTube filed purported "releases" that they 
claim Plaintiff executed, in which Plaintiff transferred all of her intellectual 
property rights to an unknown entity. Declarations of Mark Basseley 
6 
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Yousseff and Timothy L. Alger; ER 791-806. Within 48 hours, Plaintiff filed 
objections to the untimely and improper evidence, and obtained the expert 
opinion of an established, well-respected forensic document examiner, who 
concluded unequivocally that the documents offered were forgeries. 
Plaintiff's Objections to and Request to Strike Declarations of Tim Alger 
and Mark Basseley Yousseff; Declarations of M Cris Armenta, Gaylord 
Flynn, Cindy Lee Garcia and Jim Blanco; ER 817-890 and ER 895-945. 
That same day, November 30,2012, the district court abruptly canceled the 
scheduled hearing, denying Plaintiff both a preliminary injunction and her 
day in court. ER 892-849. This appeal follows. 
v. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Plaintiff Agreed to Provide a Dramatic Performance in 
"Desert Warrior" But Did Not Agree, In Writing or 
Otherwise, to Relinquish Her Copyright Interests. 
Plaintiff is an ordained Christian minister. Declaration of Cindy Lee 
Garcia ('Garcia Decl. '') ~ 3; ER 193. She began acting to supplement her 
income after her husband became disabled. Id. ~ 3; ER 193. As a minister, 
Ms. Garcia preaches tolerance and respect for all religions. Id. ~ 4; ER 193. 
The depiction of Plaintiff Garcia as a person who would participate in a 
hateful production that blasphemes any religion is devastating to her. Id. ~ 
4; ER 193. 
In July of 20 11, Plaintiff responded to a casting notice for a film 
entitled "Desert Warrior." Id. ~ 5; ER 193. Plaintiffwas cast in a 
supporting role in which, according to the film's producer, Yousseff (who at 
the time was calling himself "Sam Bacile"), she was to play the mother of a 
young woman who had been promised in marriage to the movie's 
protagonist, "Master George." (Id.) After Plaintiff was cast, Yousseff gave 
7 
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her "call sheets" that indicated the days she was to be on set, and outlined 
the scenes to be filmed. Id. ~ 6; ER 193-194. Additionally, Yousseffandlor 
his agents provided Plaintiff with "script sheets" for those scenes in which 
her character was to appear. Id. None of those sheets contained content or 
language that Plaintiff perceived to be religiously offensive. Id. Notably, 
none of the script sheets referred to a character named "Mohammed." Id. 
Plaintiff never signed a release of her rights to her dramatic 
performance (whether with respect to "Desert Warrior" or any other project), 
nor did she sign a work-for-hire agreement. Id. ~ 8; ER 194. Additionally, 
she was never an employee of Y ousseff or any production company 
associated with "Desert Warrior," nor was she an agent ofYousseff or 
anyone else. Garcia Dec!. ~ 7; ER 194. Plaintiff s position in this regard is 
entirely consistent with the recollections of other actors who appeared in the 
production: none of them apparently signed releases, nor did they sign 
work-for-hire agreements. Declaration of Dan Sutter ~ 4; Declaration of 
Gaylord Flynn ~ 8; ER 194. 
Both prior to accepting the role and while on set, Plaintiff specifically 
asked Y ousseff (who was using the alias "Sam Bacile") about the film's 
content. Garcia Decl. ~ 10; ER 194. Yousseff consistently responded that 
the film was titled "Desert Warrior," and that it was an "adventure" story set 
in the Arabian Desert 2,000 years ago. Id. Significantly, at no time during 
her presence on the set did Plaintiff hear any mention of Islam. Id. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff delivered her performance (the "Copyrighted 
Performance") as set forth in the "Desert Warrior" script. 
It is now undisputed that, contrary to his stated intentions, Y ousseff 
never intended to create an "adventure" film titled "Desert Warrior." 
Instead, as he later admitted to Plaintiff, his true intention from the 
8 
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beginning was to use her (copyrighted) performance to create an entirely 
different work, the propaganda Film titled "Innocence of Muslims." Id. ~ 
13; ER 196. 
B. Yousseff Used Plaintiff As a "Puppet" For His Own 
Prejudiced Views, and YouTube Has Knowingly Published 
the Infringing, Doctored Version of Plaintiff's Performance 
Tens of Millions of Times. 
In March of 20 12, Y ousseff requested that Plaintiff participate in a 
post-production session. Id. ~ 11; ER 195. During that session, Plaintiff 
only redelivered lines she had delivered previously. Id. Sometime after July 
2, 2012, Plaintiff telephoned Y ousseff to ask whether "Desert Warriors" was 
ready to be screened. Id. ~ 12. Y ousseff then revealed that he had posted a 
trailer on Y ouTube. Id. ~ 12. 
When Plaintiff accessed the trailer (by then retitled "Innocence of 
Muslims," and referred to throughout this brief as the "Film") on Y ouTube 
she made the horrifying discovery that Yousseffhad dubbed bigoted 
dialogue over her lines, and used her Copyrighted Performance in a manner 
that was entirely inconsistent with the production in which Yousseffhad told 
Plaintiff she was participating. Id. ~ 12; ER 195. In effect, Youssefftumed 
her into a walking, talking "puppet" for his opinion that Mohammed, the 
founder of the Islamic religion, was a "child molester." Id. 
Here are the lines that Plaintiff Garcia actually delivered in "Desert 
Warrior": 
"Is George crazy? Our daughter is but a child?" 
Id. ~ 12; ER 195. 
9 
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In contrast, in the Film ("Innocence of Muslims"), Yousseffretained 
Ms. Garcia's visual performance but dubbed in the words: 
"Is your Mohammed a child molester?" 
See id. ~ 12, and Ex. B to Declaration of Dave Hardy (,'Hardy Dec!. '') 
(YouTube video, "The Innocence of Muslims ", posted by "Sam Bacile ''); ER 
195. Plaintiff has never uttered those words, let alone on the set of "Desert 
Warrior." Garcia Decl. ~ 12; ER 196. 
C. Defendants Next Published an Arabic Version of the Film 
That Went Viral, Ultimately Resulting in the Issuance of a 
Death Sentence and Innumerable Death Threats Against 
Plaintiff, to which Defendants Are Completely Indifferent. 
On September 11,2012, the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, was 
attacked, resulting in the deaths of four Americans, including Ambassador 
Christopher Stevens. Declaration of Abou El Fadl, ~ 10; ER 248. Violence 
has continued to erupt across the world. Id. ~ 11; ER 248. Many experts in 
geopolitical affairs initially attributed this violence directly to the Film. Id. ~ 
9-15; ER 249. News reports indicate that many people worldwide have 
died in the violence that the Film has sparked. Id., Ex. D; ER 250. Whether 
or not the Film caused the violence, the violence in fact occurred, with many 
at the time attributing it to the anti-Muslim sentiment in the Film. Id., ~ 15; 
ER 249-250. 
On September 19,2012, Egyptian cleric Ahmad Fouad Ashoush 
issued a "fatwa" directed at Plaintiff and every other person appearing in 
"The Innocence of Muslims": 
10 
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I issue a fatwa and call on the Muslim youth in America and 
Europe to do this duty, which is to kill the director, the 
J?roducer and the actors and everyone who helped and promoted 
the film. 
Id. ~ 14; ER 249. 
Google Chairman Eric Schmidt's response to the fatwa was 
astounding, though perhaps not surprising given that the fatwa was not 
directed at him and, unlike Plaintiff, he likely has the financial means to hire 
private security. He said: "We believe the answer to bad speech is more 
speech ... It'll stay up." Declaration of M Cris Armenta Decl. ~ 9, & Ex. 
C; ER 489. Needless to say, neither Mr. Schmidt, nor Google, nor YouTube 
offered Plaintiff any security-related assistance, leaving Plaintiff and her 
family "sitting ducks." Naturally, Plaintiff has no desire to become a martyr 
for Yousseff and Schmidt's "cause" of attacking Islam while pretending that 
Y ouTube and Google are neutral defenders of free speech. Nor has she any 
interest in helping Defendants to profit from the 30 million-plus "views," 
and associated ad revenues, from exhibiting the Film and her Copyrighted 
Performance. 
D. Yousseff Has Admitted That He Defrauded aod Deceived 
Plaintiff for the Purpose of Procuring Her Copyrighted 
Performance in "Desert Warrior," And That He Planned 
All Along to Insert Her Performance Ioto the Propaganda 
Film. 
Immediately after seeing the news about the attacks in Libya and 
realizing that the grotesque manipulation of her performance was related to 
the violence around the world, Plaintiff asked Y ousseff why he "did this?" 
Garcia Decl. ~ 13; ER 196. He replied, "You are not responsible. Tell the 
world that you are innocent. I did this ... I did it because I am tired of the 
radical Muslims killing innocent people." Id. ~ 10; ER 194-195. In essence, 
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Y ousseff admitted that it was always his secret intention to manipulate the 
footage so that Plaintiff would appear to have participated in creating a hate 
film. Id. In that conversation, Y ousseff, by telling Plaintiff that she was 
"innocent" and "not responsible," affirmed that the work that became 
"Innocence of Muslims" was not a "joint work," and that he acted alone. 
See Garcia Deel. ~ 13; ER 196. Moreover, Mr. Yousseffs statements to 
Ms. Garcia constitute an admission that she had not given him permission to 
insert her (doctored) Copyrighted Performance in "Desert Warriors" into the 
hate Film "The Innocence of Muslims." 
E. In Addition to Becoming the Target of a Fatwa, Ms. Garcia 
Has Received Numerous Death Threats. 
Immediately after the Film "went viral" on YouTube, Plaintiff began 
to receive calls from the media, all of whom apparently were already 
somehow aware that her Copyrighted Performance was prominently featured 
in the Film. Garcia Deel. ~ 14; ER 196. Members of the media, none of 
whom had been given Ms. Garcia's address by Ms. Garcia or her family, 
camped outside her home. Id. ~ 14; ER 196.) Plaintiff learned about the 
latwa and began to receive credible and gruesome threats, including death 
threats and threats to rape her daughter. Id. In order to clear her name, to 
ensure that the world was aware that she was duped into performing for 
Y ousseff, and to clarify that she had never uttered the words attributed to her 
in the Film, she publicly declared that she does not condone the content or 
message of the Film, and that her Copyrighted Performance in "Desert 
Warrior" had been grotesquely mutilated. Id. ~ 14; ER 196. Hoping that the 
justice system would show more concern for her continued survival than had 
the Defendants, Plaintiff took legal action in state court, premised on various 
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theories of tort liability, to have the Film removed from YouTube. Id. ~~ 
14,15; ER 196-197.) 
While in Los Angeles Superior Court on September 20,2012, for a 
hearing on her state-law claims, Plaintiff and her counsel were directed by 
law enforcement to park in a secure location; seven armed Los Angeles 
County Deputy Sheriffs accompanied them in the courthouse. Id. ~ 15; ER 
196-197; Armenta Dec!. ~ 2; ER 487.) Her attorney was approached by the 
head of security for the Los Angeles Superior Court, who expressed concern 
for Plaintiff, Ms. Armenta, and both of their families; he advised that those 
threatening Plaintiff "are very patient," and that everybody connected with 
this case was in danger. Id.; Garcia Decl. ~ 15; ER 196-197. Both were 
advised to take serious security measures at home, as well as any time at 
which they may enter or exit the L.A. Superior Court in the future. Garcia 
Dec!. ~ 15 ER 196-197; Armenta Dec!. ~ 2; ER 487. 
While in New York during the last week of September 2012, Plaintiff 
and counsel were accompanied by retired police officers and other security 
officers. Garcia Dec!. ~ 16; ER 197. When they departed New York, the 
Port Authority Police would not permit Plaintiff even to enter the La 
Guardia International Airport terminal; Plaintiff was taken directly to her 
airplane on the tarmac in a squad car, for fear that she would become an 
"instant target" in the terminal. Id. Plaintiff has now moved her home, as 
well as the location of her church. Id. ~ 17; ER 197-198. The numerous 
death threats have been reported to the authorities. Id. They include, but are 
not limited to, the following: 
"I am ready to die for MUHAMMAD (PBUH) and I would 
Like to Kill all Those Who contributed in the Shape of Acting 
or Financially or any other Kind of Support in Shameless 
Movie." 
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"And If You Wanna to save your life and we consider your 
innocent then Just Kill Sam and Terry Jones." 
"Dear the end is near." 
"It's all a bigioke. She will be Killed by someone who loves 
and cares our Prophet Muhammad peace be upon him" 
"She will know what she did now she is saying sorry about 
that" 
Id. , 17 & Ex. B) (grammatical errors in original); ER 197-198. Ms. Garcia 
also received a gruesome set of threats related to raping her daughter. Id. 
As frightening and disturbing as these threats have been to Plaintiff, 
according to noted international expert and UCLA Professor Abou El Fadl, 
it is the threats that are not made that are the most dangerous. Abou El Fadl 
, 17; ER 250. Thanks to Defendants' refusal to remove the Film that 
contains her Copyrighted Performance from YouTube, Plaintiffs life has 
been changed forever. Id. , 16; ER 250. It is only her public efforts to clear 
her name that may be keeping her alive and her efforts to remove or disable 
the Film will certainly help to convince others that she is not a willing 
puppet ofa global conspiracy against Islam. Id. ,21; ER 251. 
F. Plaintiff Has Be2e:ed YouTube and Go021e to Save Her Life 
and Take Down the Film, But They Prefer to Continue to 
Profit From the Millions of Pa2eviews That the Film 
Attracts. 
In accordance with Y ouTube' s terms of service, Appellant issued the 
first of many DMCA take down notices on September 24, 2012, through her 
take down agent, DMCA Solutions. Hardy Decl., ~ 5; ER 409. Appellant 
and DMCA Solutions have issued eight take down notices. In the 
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experience ofDMCA Solutions, YouTube typically responds to an initial 
take down notice in a manner intended to protect itself from liability for 
contributory copyright infringement pursuant to the "safe harbor" provisions 
of the DMCA. Id., ,-r 4; ER 408-409. First, YouTube typically sends a 
notice advising that the notice has been received ("Acknowledgement of 
Takedown Notice"). Next, Y ouTube typically quickly removes or disables 
the allegedly infringing content pending the original poster's provision of 
proof that he or she has the right to post it. Id. 
Y ouTube itself, through the Associate General Counsel of Google, 
Inc. (YouTube's parent company) Zavanah Levine, has issued a sworn 
statement in which she agrees that YouTube's DMCA procedures are 
consistent with the observations of DMCA Solutions: 
Once Y ouTube receives a notification of alleged infringement 
that substantially complies with the DMCA requirements, we 
act promptly to remove the identified material from our service 
or disable access to it. ThrouKhout my tenure at the comp~llY, 
we have removed almost all oT the videos identified in DMCA 
notices within 24 hours; indeed for the vast majority of DMCA 
notices (about 85%), we remove the identified videos within a 
few minutes using automated tools. 
Declaration of Zavanah Levine, ,-r 19; ER 294. This time, contrary to the 
policy and protocols sworn to by Ms. Levine, and the practices long 
observed in the industry, YouTube did not remove or disable the content 
within 24 hours. Instead, it sent multiple, identical form letters denying Ms. 
Garcia's requests. Hardy Dec!. ,-r 7 & Ex. C ("YouTube 's First Substantive 
Inquiry''); ER 409-410. In response to YouTube's First Inquiry Response, 
Appellant's takedown agent sent a detailed response explaining her 
copyright interests, setting forth the relevant law. Id. ,-r 8 & Ex. D 
("Garcia's First Substantive Response ''); ER 410-412. Ms. Garcia sent the 
First Substantive Response on September 26, 2012. Id. By October 2,2012, 
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YouTube still had neither responded nor disabled the content. Id., ~ 9; ER 
412. Y ouTube has breathed life into a work of fiction that is causing 
violence and death the world over. 
On October 2, 2012, counsel for Appellant Garcia spoke directly with 
counsel for Defendants Google and YouTube. Armenta Dec!. ~ 4; ER 488. 
Defense counsel informed Ms. Armenta that the Film remained posted, that 
a decision had been made "at the highest levels" to keep it up, and that 
Y ouTube was not obligated to respond to Ms. Garcia---even though it was 
Y ouTube that had demanded "further information ... [in] as much detail as 
possible"! (Id. ) 
Within two hours of that conversation, Appellant received another 
inquiry from Y ouTube, requesting even more information. Hardy Dec!. ~ 9 
("YouTube's Second Inquiry"); ER 412-416. Appellant's takedown agent 
then issued Garcia's Second Substantive Response, citing additional relevant 
case law and provisions of the United States Copyright Act. Hardy Decl. ~ 
10 & Ex. E; ER 414. Finally on October 4,2012, YouTube set forth its final 
position - consistent with Chairman Schmidt's public remarks-that Google 
and Y ouTube would continue to post all copies of the Film. I Hardy Decl. ~ 
11 ("YouTube's Final Response''); ER 416-417. 
1 Significantly, neither Google nor YouTube has taken any steps to take 
down po stings of the Film that have been put up by third parties entirely 
unrelated to the Film or any of the persons involved in its production, which 
third parties indisputably are committing copyright infringement. 
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G. You Tube and Google Have Specific Knowled2e of the 
Infrin2in2 Material and Are in Receipt of Direct Financial 
Benefits Attributed to the Rampant Infringement. 
y ouTube has long been in possession of actual notice of the URLs 
that contain the infringing content. Y ouTube claims to have received more 
than 30 million "views" of the Film in the English language alone; it has not 
provided information of which Plaintiffs are aware that would quantify the 
number of "views". See generally Hardy Dec!. & Exs. appended thereto; ER 
408-418. It is incontrovertible that the trailer is a "draw" for consumers-
whose viewings provide Y ouTube with profit from ad revenues-to visit 
Y ouTube. Y ouTube and Google have the ability to block access to the 
trailer-in fact, they have already made the editorial judgment to do so in 
Saudi Arabia, Libya, Indonesia, and Egypt, and may have done so in other 
countries. Armenta Decl. ~ 9 & Ex. C; ER 489. 
H. Defendants Google and YouTube's Response. 
Defendants Google and Y ouTube opposed injunctive relief, arguing 
that Appellant had not identified any irreparable harm, and that Ms. Garcia 
committed inexcusable delay by because she did not file her complaint until 
September 19,2012. Defendants also argued, against the weight both of 
Ninth Circuit authority and the opinion of the United States Copyright 
Office as recently set forth at the World Intellectual Property Organization, 
both that Ms. Garcia could not hold a copyright interest in her own 
performance and that, notwithstanding the absence of a written release, her 
performance must have been a "work for hire." Defendants finally argued 
that the equities did not tip in Appellant's favor and that an injunction would 
be an unlawful prior restraint that would not serve the public interest. 
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Appellant responded in her reply brief that the ongoing death threats 
as a result of Google and YouTube's continued publication of the Film 
certainly constitute irreparable harm. Appellant also demonstrated that 
under the prevailing authority in the Ninth Circuit, and as acknowledged by 
the official position of the United States in connection with the World 
Intellectual Property Organization treaty, an actor's individual performance 
is, in fact, copyrightable, once that performance is fixed in a tangible 
medium. Finally, Appellant noted that Google and YouTube submitted no 
evidence to support their guess that Ms. Garcia must have agreed to work for 
hire. Further, two well established and indisputably relevant exceptions to 
the First Amendment apply in this case: (1) restraint against copyright 
infringement; and (2) restraint against permitting a person to shout "Fire!" in 
a crowded theater. As to the first point, it is virtually indisputed that Ms. 
Garcia never agreed to a work-for-hire or any other arrangement that would 
result in the cession of her intellectual property rights to Yousseff and/or his 
agents. As to the second point, it is well to remember that Y ouTube itself 
erected a crowded theater, and given that Yousseff clearly (and successfully) 
intended the Film to incite violence, restraining further publication of the 
trailer does not run afoul of the First Amendment. The public, would, in 
fact, be served by restraining further publication of the Film, when 
considering balancing the right to speak versus the violence that has ensued. 
Nothing stops Y ousseff or any other person from insulting Muslims, the 
Islamic religion, or any Islamic religious figures, including Mohammed. 
However, what Defendants may not do is force Ms. Garcia to do their dirty 
work, in contravention of her own opinions and beliefs. 
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I. Defendants Google and YouTube Employed Forgery and 
the Declaration of a Convicted Fraudster to Bolster Their 
Defense at the Eleventh Hour Before the Hearing in This 
Case. 
After the motion for preliminary injunction was fully briefed and all 
that awaited was the December 3,2012, hearing, on November 28,2012, 
Defendants Google and Y ouTube submitted two declarations without any 
leave of court to do so. Defendant Y ousseff, a convicted fraudster who is 
currently sitting in a federal prison for various parole violations related to 
that conviction, executed a declaration (apparently drafted by counsel for 
Google and Y ouTube) that attached two documents, a "Cast Deal Memo" 
and a "Release," both of which Appellant purportedly signed. Appellant 
questioned the authenticity of the documents, informed defense counsel of 
their dubious nature, and immediately retained a well-respected forensic 
document examiner, James Blanco. After reviewing the documents and 
numerous samples of Plaintiffs handwriting, Mr. Blanco concluded 
unequivocally that Mr. Yousseffs documents are a forgery. Appellant 
alerted Defendants and the Court that Mr. Blanco's signed declaration would 
be forthcoming and made efforts to immediately secure and file it. To her 
shock, just minutes before she uploaded Mr. Blanco's declaration was 
uploaded to the court's electronic filing system, the district court issued an 
order denying the motion for preliminary injunction and vacating the 
December 3,2012 hearing. 
The district court's decision does not appear on its face to have been 
dependent on the forged documents submitted by Defendants Google and 
YouTube. It is significant to note, however, that the assumption that 
Defendants Google and Y ouTube offered in their opposition - that 
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Appellant must have signed a release (because everyone in the film industry 
signs one) - has been handily refuted. Ms. Garcia never signed any release 
of her rights, was not an employee of Y ousseff or anybody else, and her 
performance was not documented as a "work for hire." 
J. The District Court's Decision. 
As noted above, the district court refused to hear oral argument and 
denied Appellant's motion apparently without having the benefit of the 
knowledge that Defendants are now staking their case on forged documents. 
In its decision, the district court instead concluded that Appellant failed to 
show irreparable harm.2 It further concluded that Ms. Garcia holds no 
copyright interest to her dramatic performance in the Film. 
The district court's decision was wrong for many reasons. First, the 
district court failed to acknowledge that the performance Ms. Garcia 
delivered was for the "adventure" story "Desert Warrior," not the 
propaganda Film "Innocence of Muslims." Second, the district court erred 
and missed the point when it held that because Appellant is not the "author" 
of "Desert Warrior," unlike a producer, director or scriptwriter, she could 
not hold a copyright - she does, but only in the part that constitutes her 
creative performance. Specifically, the court concluded that the "movie was 
intended by everyone involved with it to be a unitary whole," and therefore 
the copyright "vests initially in the author or authors of the work," and does 
no vest in an actor - contrary to the case law, the United States Copyright 
2 Under the district court's reasoning, it would be hard to imagine a case in 
which a Appellant could show imminent or irreparable harm. Must Cindy 
Lee Garcia be murdered as threatened, must her daughter be raped as 
threatened, must the fatwa be carried out as threatened resulting in her 
murder or the rape of her daughter, in order for her to demonstrate the 
likelihood of harm? 
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Act and the position of the United States in recently approving an 
international treaty on the subject. Third, although the district court 
acknowledged Appellant's position "that she owns the copyright of her 
performance," it concluded that Appellant "necessarily (if impliedly) would 
have granted the Film's author a license to distribute her performance as a 
contribution incorporated into the indivisible whole of the Film." This 
conclusion was wrong not only because it conflicts with the law of the Ninth 
Circuit and the position of the U.S. Copyright Office, but also because even 
if Ms. Garcia did grant some implied, non-written, unspoken "license" to 
Y ousseff and! or his agents, the scope of that license would have been limited 
to the use of her performance in a desert adventure film with the working 
title "Desert Warrior" - not a propaganda Film in which her lines were re-
dubbed with the express intention of fomenting worldwide hatred. Having 
denied the motion on the above grounds, the district court did not reach the 
issues of balance of equities and the public interest. 
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Act and the position of the United States in recently approving an 
international treaty on the subject. Third, although the district court 
acknowledged Appellant's position "that she owns the copyright of her 
performance," it concluded that Appellant "necessarily (if impliedly) would 
have granted the Film's author a license to distribute her performance as a 
contribution incorporated into the indivisible whole of the Film." This 
conclusion was wrong not only because it conflicts with the law of the Ninth 
Circuit and the position of the U.S. Copyright Office, but also because even 
if Ms. Garcia did grant some implied, non-written, unspoken "license" to 
Y ousseff and! or his agents, the scope of that license would have been limited 
to the use of her performance in a desert adventure film with the working 
title "Desert Warrior" - not a propaganda Film in which her lines were re-
dubbed with the express intention of fomenting worldwide hatred. Having 
denied the motion on the above grounds, the district court did not reach the 
issues of balance of equities and the public interest. 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The primary legal question, which will impact the entire entertainment 
industry, is whether an actor owns a copyrightable interest in her dramatic 
performance in a film, where the actor has not made a writing assigning her 
interest and the film makers later take her performance and insert a doctored 
version of it into a wholly different property. By way of example, if an actor 
performed in a benign action film or documentary and the filmmaker later 
took that benign performance and inserted it into a hard-core pornographic 
film, does the actor retain a copyrightable interest in his or her original 
performance such that he or she could avail herself of the remedies of the 
United States Copyright Act to enjoin publication of the performance in the 
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later work? The answer is yes, and is guided quite specifically by this 
Circuit's decision in Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 
1990). In Effects, this Circuit held that a contributor in a film retains 
ownership of its copyright interests, but where there is an implied license to 
use the contribution, if the scope of that license is exceeded, a copyright 
claim may be launched. 
VII. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The denial of a preliminary injunction is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 
(9th Cir. 2011). A district court abuses its discretion ifit bases its decision 
"on an erroneous legal standard or clearly erroneous findings of fact." Id. 
(quoting Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981,986 (9th Cir. 2008) (en 
banc). A district court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo and its 
factual findings for clear error. Id. (quoting Lands Council, 537 F.3d at 986-
87). In doing so, the reviewing court "first look[ s]] to whether the trial court 
identified and applied the correct legal rule to the relief requested. Second, 
the court looks to whether the trial court's resolution resulted from a factual 
finding that was illogical, implausible or without support in inferences that 
may be drawn from the facts in the record. United States v. Hinkson, 585 
F.3d 1247. 1263 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff "must establish that he 
is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm 
in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his 
favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Winter v. NRDC, 555 
U.S. 7, 20 (2008). A preliminary injunction is proper if there is a likelihood 
of irreparable injury to plaintiff; there are serious questions going to the 
merits, the balance of hardships tips sharply in favor of the plaintiff; and the 
22 
Case: 12-57302     01/18/2013          ID: 8479689     DktEntry: 5-1     Page: 31 of 47
injunction is in the public interest. Alliance for Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 
1131-1132. 
VIII. ARGUMENT 
The district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a 
preliminary injunction and was incorrect in its conclusions of law. 
A. Plaintiff Is Likely to Succeed on the Merits 
1. Plaintiff Clearly Owns the Rights to Her Dramatic 
Performance. 
Once Ms. Garcia's performance was put in film, it became a 
"dramatic work" "fixed in [ a] tangible medium of expression" that could be 
"perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated" through "the aid of a 
machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); see Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 50 Cal. App. 
4th 1911, 1919-1920 (1996) ("their individual performances in the film 
White Dragon were copyrightable. Since their section 3344 claims seek 
only to prevent CBS from reproducing and distributing their performances in 
the film, their claims must be preempted by federal copyright law"); see also 
Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada, Inc., 617 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 
2010) (holding that claim that actor's right of publicity claim, arising from 
unauthorized use of performance in DVD's, came within subject of 
copyright); Laws v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 
2006) (finding voice recordings were plainly original works of authorship 
fixed in a tangible medium). Ms. Garcia's individual performance in the 
film "Desert Warrior" is copyrightable. See ide (actors' individual 
performances in film are copyrightable). 
The district court apparently was under the impression that an actor's 
rights to his or her performance automatically revert to the filmmaker once 
they collaborate to create a unitary work. Not true. First, if that were the 
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law, filmmakers would not engage in the universal practice of requiring their 
actors to release their copyrights as a condition of appearing in films, which 
did not occur in this case. Second, Laws v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 448 
F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006), and Jules Jordan Video, 617 F.3d 1146, 
confirm that in the Ninth Circuit, a performer retains the rights in her 
performance unless she transfers or assigns them: (1) by virtue of her status 
as an employee of the filmmaker; (2) by a written assignment of the 
copyright; or (3) by executing a written work-for-hire agreement. In fact, it 
is clear that the law, not only of the Ninth Circuit, but also as understood by 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office and the Copyright Office, is 
and a/ways has been that the copyright interest in an actor's performance 
resides with that actor until and unless it is assigned. (See RJN at 3.) 
The United States publicly affirmed this position in connection with 
the signing of the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") 
Audiovisual Dramatic Performance Treaty ("A VP Treaty") signed in 
Beijing, China in July of2012. See RJN at 4; ER a176-177. The United 
States was instrumental in encouraging other countries to sign the A VP 
Treaty in order to bring other countries into compliance with the long-
standing acknowledgement in the United States that actors, just like 
musicians, own the rights to their performances unless assigned, unless they 
are employees, or unless they execute a written instrument indicating their 
work is a work-for-hire. The formal statement issued by the United States 
Copyright Office, in connection with the A VP Treaty, states: 
24 
Case: 12-57302     01/18/2013          ID: 8479689     DktEntry: 5-1     Page: 33 of 47
Under U.S. law, actors and musicians are considered to be 
"authors" of their performances providing them with 
copyright rights. 
Just as the rights established in the U.S. law already p rovide 
the protection for musical performers mandated by tile WPPT, 
U.S. law is already generally com,patible with the A VP 
provisions ("points of atlacfunent for parties to this treaty 
under U.S. law). 
See RJN at 4; ER 177. 
Because U.S. law firmly establishes that actors own the copyrights in 
their performances unless assigned or otherwise relinquished, Plaintiff 
Garcia retains the copyright to her performance. See,~, TMTV Corp. v 
Pegasus Broad. of San Juan, 490 F Supp. 2d 228 (D.C. Puerto Rico 2007) 
(actors' portrayals of characters rendered them "authors"). 
2. Plaintiff Never Assigned Her Copyright Interests, As 
Required by This Court's Decision in Effects Associates. 
Appellant is aware of no authority requiring her to bear the burden to 
show that she did not transfer her rights. Imposing such a burden on 
Appellant would be entirely inconsistent with the Copyright Act's well-
established requirement that a copyright assignment be made in writing. See 
17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (exclusive copyright assignment must be in writing; 17 
U.S.C. § 201(b) (writing required for work-for-hire). Appellant executed no 
such writing transferring or assigning her rights. Garcia Decl. ~~ 7-9; ER 
194. 
In many cases, an actor or musician relinquishes his or her copyright 
interests to a studio or filmmaker in writing and loses the right to assert a 
copyright claim in a performance. See, e.g., Brown v. Twentieth Century 
3 In direct contravention to the position of the United States in connection 
with advancing the A VP Treaty, the district court held that actors are not 
"authors" of their performances. 
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Fox Film Corp., 799 F. Supp. 166 (D.D.C. 1992) (James Brown transferred 
rights to song "Please, Please, Please," and could not object to use of a 
musical clip captured on film); Rooney v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 538 F. 
Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (actor Mickey Rooney signed contracts broad 
enough to transfer rights in his performances); Muller v. Walt Disney 
Productions, 871 F. Supp. 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (conductor made writing in 
which he gave up rights to his performance). 
That did not happen here. 
Appellant's recollection coincides with that of other "Desert Warrior" 
actors, who also did not sign releases. (Declaration of Dan Sutter_ ~ 4 ER 
239; Declaration of Gaylord Flynn ~ 4, ER 241-242.) Moreover, the Ninth 
Circuit has resoundingly rejected the argument that moviemakers enjoy 
some special status under the Copyright Act allowing them to avoid the 
writing requirement. Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, et aI., 908 F.2d 555 
(9th Cir. 1990), is instructive. In that case, the plaintiff created special 
effects for use in a film, and then brought a copyright infringement action 
against the producer. As in this case, the parties had no written agreement 
regarding transfer of the plaintiffs copyright to the producer. The Ninth 
Circuit held that, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs rights had not transferred: 
"Absent an express transfer of ownership, a contributor who is not an 
employee retains ownership of his copyright." Id. at 558 (citing Easter Seal 
Society v. Playboy Enters., 815 F. 2d 323, 329 (5 th Cir. 1987)). The court 
went on to hold: 
[Slection 101 specifically addresses the movie and book 
publishing industries, aftording moviemakers a simple, 
~traightf~rward w~y of obtaining owner~hip of the copyright 
In a creatIve contnbutlOn - namely a wrItten agreement. The 
Supreme Court and this circuit, while recognizmg the custom 
ana practice in the industry, have refused to permit 
movlemakers to sidestep section 2fJ4 's writing requirement. 
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Accordinglr, we find unpersuasive Cohen's contention that 
section 204 s writing requirement, which singles out no 
particular group, somehow doesn't apply to rum. As section 
204 makes no special allowances for the movie industry, 
neither do we. 
Effects Assoc. at 558 (emphasis added). See also Oddo v. Ries, 743 F. 2d 
630 (9th Cir 1984) (publishing of distorted manuscript exceeded scope of 
initial contributor's work; publisher liable for copyright infringement). 
Thus, because no writing exists showing either a transfer of rights or a work-
for-hire agreement, the copyright in Appellant's performance remains intact. 
3. Defendant Y ousseff and Plaintiff Garcia Never Agreed, 
in Writing or Otherwise, to Create a "Joint Work of 
Authorship," as Google and YouTube Apparently Claim. 
Appellant anticipated Y ouTube to oppose, claiming Appellant could 
not sue Defendant Y ousseff for copyright infringement (or, by extension, 
Google and Y ouTube for contributory infringement) because Appellant and 
Defendant Yousseff created a "joint work of authorship." However, 
Appellantnever had a meeting of the minds with Defendant Y ousseff, other 
than perhaps pertaining to "Desert Warrior." "Joint work" defenses should 
be carefully evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the 
"authors" intended to create a "unitary work." Here, Y ousseff s fraudulent 
procurement of Ms. Garcia's performance did not create a joint agreement 
on anything related to the propaganda Film "The Innocence of Muslims." 
Initially, Appellant notes that the burden is on Defendants, not on her, 
to show that both she and Y ousseff intended that the doctored propaganda 
Film "The Innocence of Muslims," which she was tricked into believing was 
a desert historical adventure called "Desert Warrior," would be a joint work 
of authorship. 
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Although the Second and Seventh Circuits do not base their 
decisions [as to joint authorship] on the word 'authors' in the 
statute, the practical results they reach are consistent with ours. 
These cirCUIts have held that a Rerson claiming to be an author 
of a joint work must prove that both parties intended each 
other to be joint authors. 
Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.2d 1227, 1233-1234 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis 
added). Aalmuhammad is significant in two ways, both of which the district 
court ignored: First, as noted above, it establishes that the burden is on the 
putative joint author, not the person claiming a sole copyright, to prove the 
intent to create a jointly authored work. Second, it suggests that in this case, 
where there is no written joint authorship agreement, a contributory infringer 
such as Google or Y ouTube cannot establish a joint authorship defense, 
because it cannot prove Ms. Garcia's or Yousseffs subjective intentions. 
Perhaps this second point is academic, because in this case the 
uncontroverted evidence is that Appellant never intended to be a 'joint 
author" of "The Innocence of Muslims," given that Defendant Yousseff 
tricked her by assuring her that she was appearing in an innocuous action 
film called "Desert Warrior." 
Even if the burden of proof were not an insurmountable obstacle for 
Defendants, the law of joint authorship would be. While "joint" authors 
may not sue each other in copyright, see 17 U.S.C. § 101, a "joint work" 
exists "only when both authors intended at the time the work was created, 
'that their contributions be merged into separate or interdependent parts of 
a unitary whole. '" Id.; Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2nd Cir. 1991) 
(emphasis added). "Copyright law best serves the interests of creativity 
when it carefully draws the bounds of 'joint authorship' so as to protect the 
legitimate claims of both sole authors and co-authors." Id. "Where the 
author never intended for his material to be part of a joint work, he retains 
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the right to that material." Siegel v. Time Warner, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 2d 
1111, 1148 (C.D. Cal. 2007). If the parties' intentions at the beginning of 
the creative process are inconsistent, there is "a lack of intent to form a 
joint work." See, e.g., Reinsdorfv. Skechers, U.S.A., 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 28293, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9,2011) (use of copyrighted 
photographs was limited to terms of license, not entitling Skechers to use 
them as it "saw fit,,).4 
4. YouTube Has Stepped Far Outside the DMCA's Safe 
Harbor Provision, Subjecting it To Liability for 
Copyright Infringement. 
_"The DMCA was enacted in 1998 to implement the World 
Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty," Universal City 
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.2d 429,440 (2d Cir. 2001), and to update 
domestic copyright law. See Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th 
Cir.2004). Title II of the DMCA, titled separately the Online Copyright 
Infringement Liability Limitation Act ("OCILLA") was designed to 
"c1arifTy] the liability faced by service providers who transmit potentially 
infringing material over their networks." S. Rep. 105-190 at 2 (1998). 
29 
Case: 12-57302     01/18/2013          ID: 8479689     DktEntry: 5-1     Page: 38 of 47
Congress elected "to create a series of 'safe harbors []' for certain common 
activities of service providers." Id. at 19. To that end, OCILLA established 
a serious of four "safe harbors" that allow qualifying service providers to 
limit their liability for claims of copyright infringement. See Viacom, et al. 
v. YouTube, et aI, (2nd Cir. AprilS, 2012), Case No. 10-3270 CV (RJN at 
4.) YouTube is such a provider. See generally id.; see also RJN 6 (2nd 
Circuit opinion on DMCA issues relative to Y ouTube). 
Under 512(c)(1)(A), safe harbor protection is available only if the 
service provider: 
(i) Does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity 
using the material on the system or network is infringing; 
(ii) In the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts 
or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or 
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts 
expeditiously to remove or disable access to the material. 
In short, OCILLA creates a safe harbor for online service providers 
("OSPs"), only if they adhere to the mandatory safe harbor guidelines and 
"expeditiously" block access to alleged infringing material, or remove that 
material from their systems when they receive a notification of an 
infringement claim from a copyright holder or the copyright holder's agent. 
OCILLA also includes a counter-notification provision that offers OSPs a 
safe harbor from liability when users claim that the material in question is 
not, in fact, infringing. 
5. Even if Defendant YousseffHad a Joint Copyright 
Interest with Ms. Garcia, None of the Third Parties Who 
Have Posted the Film Have A Right to Do So, and Are 
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Infringing on Plaintiff s Copyright With Y ouTube' s Full 
Knowledge and Consent. 
While Y ouTube and Google may raise the issue of "joint work" and 
joint copyright as between Appellant and Yousseff (albeit Appellant 
absolutely contests that argument as stated above), there is no such issue 
with respect to the hundreds of third parties who have copied the Film and 
re-posted it on Y ouTube, accounting for tens of millions of views for 
Y ouTube. It is undisputed that these third parties have no right to copy and 
re-post the Film, and are clearly committing copyright infringement. 
Defendants Y ouTube and Google cannot argue otherwise, and have been on 
notice of these massive acts of infringement for quite some time. The eight 
DMCA takedown notices delivered by Ms. Garcia's DMCA take down agent 
specifically named and identified these third party Y ouTube URLs and 
requested that Y ouTube remove or disable them. Defendants Y ouTube and 
Google have refused. 
IX. APPELLANT CONTINUES TO SUFFER IRREPARABLE 
HARM IN THE ABSENCE OF AN INJUNCTION 
At this point in the proceedings, in light of the district court's disposal 
of Ms. Garcia's request for an emergency temporary restraining order 
("TRO"), it is the law applicable to temporary injunctions that applies in this 
case. That said, even under the far stricter standards that apply to a TRO, 
Ms. Garcia was entitled to relief. In order to obtain a TRO, a plaintiff must 
be in danger of an irreparable injury that is both likely and immediate. 
Winter v. Nat. Res. Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 129 S.Ct. 365, 374-
75, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008); Caribbean Marine Services Co .. , Inc. v. 
Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) ("a plaintiff must demonstrate 
immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive 
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relief'). Risk of death constitutes "irreparable harm." See, e.g., Harris v. 
Board of Supervisors, 366 F.3d 754, 766 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming 
preliminary injunction barring Los Angeles County from closing hospital 
and reducing public hospital beds due to risk of irreparable harm to patients 
including death); Yue v. Conseco, CV 11-9506 AHM, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 46565, 40-41 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2012) (preliminary injunction 
warranted against increased cost of life insurance because loss of "security" 
and "peace of mind" constitutes irreparable injury). 
Appellant more than met her burden. As set forth above and in the 
accompanying declarations, she has suffered and will continue to suffer 
immediate and irreparable harm if the Film is not taken down: 
• Ms. Garcia received credible threats of death and harm against 
both herself and her family (one individual threatened to rape 
her daughter repeatedly); 
• Ms. Garcia has had to move her personal residence due to 
threats and harassment; 
• Appellant has been advised repeatedly and in the strongest 
terms to take the most stringent security measures possible to 
protect herself; and 
• Every moment the Film remains on Y ouTube, her copyright 
continues to be violated. 
x. THE BALANCE OF EQUITIES IS IN PLAINTIFF'S FAVOR 
Under the circumstances of this case - not just the serious intellectual 
property issues raised by Ms. Garcia's claim, but more importantly, the 
credible threats of death against her, the hardship to Ms. Garcia if the Film is 
not removed is grave indeed. It is true that the law requires this Court to 
"balance" the relative hardships to the parties when evaluating a request for 
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a temporary restraining order. To this day, Defendants Google and 
Y ouTube have provided Ms. Garcia with no rationale for their cruel decision 
to continue to endanger her life by continuing to publish the video: the only 
excuses they make for themselves are: (1) Yousseffs racist belief that "the 
Muslims" have killed unspecified "innocent" people; and (2) Google 
Chairman Eric Schmidt's disingenuous claim that the problems experienced 
by innocent people (such as Ms. Garcia) due to the Film can simply be cured 
with "more speech."s In reality, the circumstantial evidence is far more 
damning, particularly to Google and Y ouTube. As set forth on the Y ouTube 
site, the Film has received more than 30 million page "views" in English 
alone-and Ms. Garcia expects that number to soar once discovery 
commences and she obtains page view numbers for Arabic-language 
versions. Because Y ouTube derives income from advertising revenues and 
"views", it has 30 million reasons to leave the Film where it is, and let Ms. 
Garcia fend for herself. 
The balance of hardships cannot tip to any side other than to 
Appellant. "The balance of equities strongly favors [the Plaintiff] because 
Defendants' only interest is fiscal, whereas the [Plaintiff] faces life or death 
consequences." See Oster v. Lightboume, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138191 
(N.D. Cal. 2011) 
XI. AN INJUNCTION IS DECIDLY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
Finally, Appellant must show that an injunction is in the public 
interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 365,374,376 
S Of course, Mr. Schmidt's encouragement of "more speech" directly 
contradicts that of his counsel, Tim Alger, who has repeatedly blamed 
Plaintiffs exercise of her right to free speech - that is, her public stance in 
distancing herself from the Film - for the peril she is currently experiencing. 
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(2008); National Meat Ass'n v. Brown, 599 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2010); 
see also Beardslee v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 2005). It is. 
Defendants' actions have not just put the life of Cindy Lee Garcia in danger. 
They have endangered the lives of every actor and member of the crew 
subject to the latwa. Media reports have already reported numerous deaths 
caused by violence related to the Film. The web giant known as Google, a 
name derived from the number 10 with 100 zeroes, pursues Mammon at the 
expense of innocents. 
Appellant anticipates that Defendants to argue again that the First 
Amendment trumps the worldwide carnage sparked by the Film. It does not. 
First, Ms. Garcia is a private individual who is not acting in concert with the 
state; she therefore is not capable of violating the First Amendment. See, 
e.g., Law v. Miller, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102527 (E.D. Cal. 2011) 
(rejecting claim that non-governmental parties violated First Amendment 
where defendants were not state employees and there was no nexus between 
the defendants and the state such that the defendants' actions might fairly be 
treated as those of the state). Second, the First Amendment does not protect 
copyright infringement. Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443 
(C.D. Cal. 2007) ("To the extent that the users are engaged in copyright 
infringement, the First Amendment affords them no protection 
whatsoever.") (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559). Third, even if the 
Film did not violate Ms. Garcia's copyright, by now it is clear that 
Defendants' actions can be compared to falsely shouting "Fire!" in a theater, 
creating a "clear and present danger" outside the protections of the First 
Amendment. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 
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L.Ed.470. Accordingly, this public interest would be best protected by a 
take down order. 6 
Further, Defendant Yousseffviolated the terms of his federal criminal 
probation by posting the Film - he was prohibited from using a computer or 
accessing the Internet. (See RJN 5 & Ex. B.) As the worldwide events 
described in this brief unfolded, Defendant Y ousseff was arrested on a 
probation violation and now sits in the Metropolitan Detention Center in Los 
Angeles. Magistrate Judge Segal found that he may have violated the terms 
of his probation, used aliases, and is both a flight risk and danger to the 
community. (See RJN 5 & Ex. B.) The public has an interest in ensuring 
that criminal defendants do not violate probation terms -- and that Google 
and Y ouTube not continue to aid and abet him in doing so 7 - which is 
exactly what has here been done. 
XII. RELIEF REQUESTED 
Based on the above, Appellant requests that the district court's order 
denying the motion for preliminary injunction be reversed. The specific 
relief requested by Appellant in the lower Court was an order enjoining 
Google and Y ouTube: 
6 YouTube's own guidelines prohibit the P9sting of "hate speech"-a 
clearer case of hate speech is hard to imagine. Y ouTube can haraly claim an 
interest, other than a monetary one, in continuing its unlimited exliibit of the 
Film. 
7 "Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, 
counsels, commends, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a 
principal." 18 U.S.C. § 2. In this case, Defendants Google and YouTube 
are now knowingly aiding and abetting Defendant Y ousseff s continued 
violation of his federal probation by keeping the video posted. Counsel for 
Plaintiff have provided counsel for Y ouTube and Google the Judgment and 
Commitment for Y ousseff showing that he was prohibited from using the 
Internet, computers, or ISPs without the permission of the United States 
Probation Officer. 
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1. From publishing, reproducing, disclosing, or otherwise 
allowing the Copyrighted Performance (the original, un-dubbed script of 
which is identified in Exhibit A to Ms. Garcia's Complaint) to be uploaded 
or shown on YouTube.com and any other Websites operated by Defendants, 
or any of them, and from copying or allowing the content to be copied into 
any computer database, information service, storage facility, archives or 
other computerized network or facility: 
2. From disclosing or displaying, or causing to be disclosed or 
displayed, any portion of Ms. Garcia's Copyrighted Performance; 
3. From destroying or concealing, or in any way disposing of any 
reproduction, facsimile, excerpt, or derivative of any work related to the 
Copyrighted Performance that is in Defendants' possession, custody or 
control. 
Appellant also sought an impoundment order, such that Defendants 
tum over for impoundment, to remain in the custody of Ms. Garcia's counsel 
during the pendency of this action, all unauthorized copies of in their 
custody, possession or control of the copyrighted works of Ms. Garcia, 
including but not limited to: 
4. All copies of the Copyrighted Performance, whether contained 
in the Film, whether as titled "Desert Warrior" or "The Innocence of 
Muslims," in the possession, custody, or control of Defendants. 
5. Any and all media in which the Copyrighted Performance is 
stored within the possession, custody, or control of Google and YouTube, 
including but not limited to computers, computer disks, cassette tapes, hard 
drives, CD-ROMs, DVDs, USB sticks, and other media. 
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XII. CONCLUSION 
In summary, the district court's conclusion is insupportable: under 
controlling legal authority, Ms. Garcia does have a property interest in her 
Copyrighted Perfonnance. If this Court adopted the trial court's view of 
copyright law, it would tum the entire media and music industry on their 
heads. Further, the trial court relied on no evidence whatsoever to support 
its findings, whether explicit or implicit, that Garcia was an employee and/or 
produced a "work for hire." Indeed, Defendants' late proffer of forged 
documents purporting to create such a relationship reveals that even 
Defendants are aware that Ms. Garcia never ceded her copyright interest. 
Additionally, the district court erred in faulting Appellant for the timing of 
her motion: Plaintiff has shown that she acted immediately once she 
understood the danger (both to her property and her life) that Defendants had 
placed her in. 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court 
REVERSE the trial court's denial of her request for a preliminary injunction. 
Dated: January 18,2013 
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